Many observers of American politics have been highly critical of the proliferation of primaries that occurred in the 1970s. One of the reasons given for this unfavorable assessment is that the direct primary cannot consistently yield candidates who have broad electoral support-something that is thought necessary to win general elections. And since the major goal of parties is to win elections, this perceived shortcoming is cause for concern.
allocation affect the number of delegates a candidate receives and hence affect how the preferences of voters are registered. If we want the allocation of delegates to reflect accurately the popularity of candidates, then we want a system that does not skew the results in favor of particular candidates by magnifying the size of their victory (or loss).
There have been four basic allocation systems: proportional representation, winner-take-more, winner-take-all, and "loophole." A state using proportional representation allocates delegates among candidates in proportion to their share of the vote. The winner-take-more system, adopted for the Democratic contest in 1984, allocates delegates to candidates by congressional district in proportion to their share of the vote, but the winner of the district receives a bonus delegate. The winnertake-all system gives all the state's delegates to the candidate who receives the most votes statewide. A "loophole" primary is winner-take-all by congressional district. If for example, all states were winnertake-all, candidates might target resources in those states in which they had a chance, while in a system of proportional representation, candidates 2 This classification does not take account of all the variations in the rules for primaries, since individual states often introduce slight differences. For example, the minimum share of the vote necessary to qualify for delegates often varies between states. David and Ceasar (1980) note that "despite the increased standardization in selection procedure that has taken place over the past decade (especially in the Democratic party), each state nomination race remains in many respects unique, colored by its own laws, party rules, traditions and political culture." Nonetheless, my four categories encompass the major differences.
3See Lengle and Shafer (1976 A system of allocation would record votes accurately if candidates were awarded delegates in strict proportion to their shares of the primary vote; that is, the responsiveness would be 1 with a bias of 50% and a threshold of 0%.7 No system in actual use is likely to measure the preferences of voters so accurately. As Tufte (1973) argues, "arrangements for translating votes into legislative seats almost always work to benefit the party winning the largest share of the votes" (p. 540).8 Nevertheless, this ideal outcome provides a benchmark by which to judge the different systems and how candidates profited from various ways of apportioning delegates. This change is due to the increased number of states using proportional representation in 1976. The responsiveness for proportional representation is almost 1 to 1, while in loophole contests it is almost 2 to 1.
The Republican contests in 1976 were relatively unbiased, but the slopes were high. The slope is 2 for all cases, and this figure rises to 3.36 when one examines only loophole states. While President Ford benefited from the rules, he did so to a lesser degree than did McGovern in 1972. The 6 Tufte (1973) notes this problem and examines two nonlinear fits-the "cube law" and a logit model. He concludes that while the logistic fit was "statistically more satisfactory than the linear fit . .. its coefficients are not as readily interpretable from a political point of view as those of the linear model" (p. 547). I also tried both nonlinear fits for a number of years and concluded they were not so useful as the linear model. 7 Note that the bias and threshold are directly related to each other, since they both are a product of the x-intercept. I report them separately because they are useful indicators in assessing the allocation rules.
8 Rae (1967) responsiveness of the system of delegate apportionment slightly favored Ford over Governor Reagan. In 1980 Reagan was able to turn the tables partially. He had a very favorable bias-33% of the vote gave him 50% of the delegates. George Bush, however, had a more favorable translation of votes into delegates-1.54 to 1.01. As with the Democrats, the states using proportional representation came closer to an accurate reflection of the vote. The rules for the 1980 Democratic nomination contest produced the most accurate system so far: responsiveness was 1.23, bias 45.6%, and threshold 4.9%. The reason for these results is that almost all states employed a proportional representation system in that year. There was also little difference in swing ratio or bias between President Carter and Senator Kennedy: Carter's swing ratio was 1.22, while Kennedy's was 1.16, while the bias suggests only a slight edge to Carter-44.6% to 46.6%.
The rules governing the 1984 Democratic nomination contest benefited Walter Mondale, as the former vice-president's strategists intended. He typically needed about 38% of the vote to receive 50% of the delegates. The swing ratio for Mondale was 1.39, a figure similar to that for Senator Hart, but larger than that for Jackson (1.2). Jackson also generally needed more votes than either of his rivals to receive 50% of the delegates. As in other years, the proportional representation system produced the results that best reflected the candidates' share of the vote, with the loophole systems doing the worst job.9
During the 1984 pre-nomination campaign, Jesse Jackson complained that the system of delegate apportionment treated him unfairly.1o His complaints are clearly warranted. Compared with Mondale, Jackson had a higher threshold, lower responsiveness, and a less favorable bias. He was not, however, the most disadvantaged candidate in recent years; that dubious honor goes to Humphrey.
Allocating delegates in proportion to a candidate's share of the vote is clearly the best way for primaries to record the preferences of voters accurately." In states that used proportional representation, the fraction of the delegates awarded a candidate roughly reflects his or her fraction of the vote, while the other rules skew the results. Parties often write the rules, however, to favor particular candidates. It is difficult to separate the "feelings about changes in the rules from their [the rule makers] policy and candidate preferences" (Ranney, 1975, p. 144) . The purpose of the 9 As a side note, while the rules governing the primary contests from 1972 to 1984 introduced bias into the allocation of delegates, the primary rules appear "fairer" than the electoral systems Tufte (1973) The preference ballot, or the "alternative vote," allows each voter to rank candidates from first to last choice. The first criticism is a hybrid of correct and incorrect claims. It is true that preference voting could eliminate potential plurality winners-but only if the plurality winners had little or no support outside their narrow circle of voters. Thus, George McGovern, the plurality winner in 1972, probably could not have been nominated in 1972 because many of the 70 percent of primary voters that did not vote for him that year strongly disliked him. But the elimination of plurality winners with narrow bases of support would not hamper party unity; it would, in all probability, make it easier by ensuring that whoever did win the nomination would have broad support within the party.
Moreover, one must remember that the main purpose of preference voting is to secure candidates who are minimally acceptable to the entire electorate. That means preventing intense but extreme minorities from putting their first choice over on unwilling majorities. Critics who object to this feature of the preference ballot are thus claiming, in effect, that the feelings of intense minorities are more important than those of majorities. Whatever may be said for that position on normative grounds, it is not one that is well calculated for coalition-building and winning general elections.
This criticism also incorrectly assumes that plurality winners necessarily represent the feelings of intense minorities. In some cases, a plurality winner may emerge only because of the particular field of candidates. For example, one liberal in a field of a half a dozen moderates is likely to emerge as a plurality winner even though any of several moderates might have much broader appeal in the party. That preference voting would prevent such plurality victories is its strength rather than its weakness.
The second criticism does identify a potential problem for the preference system. In a multi-candidate race, the elimination of the Another advantage of preference voting is that it asks voters to think in terms they are well accustomed to. Voters can easily rank preferences and often do so. When confronted with a series of options, people often rank them: "I'd rather visit my parents than go shopping, but I do not want to watch television." Since voters have preferences, we should ask them, and by so doing obtain better information about their preferences.
At this point, I have advocated two reforms for presidential primariesallocate delegates to candidates in proportion to their share of the vote and adopt a preference ballot. Under these two changes, if one candidate receives 50% or more first-place votes, the delegates would be allocated proportionally to all contenders. But if no candidate won at least 50% of the vote, a likely possibility in early primaries, then the last-place finisher would be eliminated and that candidate's supporters would be given to their second preference. This process would continue until one candidate has 50% of the vote. At that point, delegates would be allocated proportionally to the remaining candidates.'5 These reforms would prevent candidates with narrow bases of support from winning primaries, because a candidate must have at least some degree of support from 50% of the electorate to win a primary. And at the same time, the proportional representation rule assures that all "serious" candidates win a share of the delegates commensurate with their share of the vote. Consequently, the combination of these two rules should allow for an accurate assessment of the breadth of a candidate's support-a goal that was central to the nomination of candidates in the "mixed" system.
WHO SHOULD VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES?
While determining the breadth of support for a candidate is important to selecting electable nominees, we must now decide whose support should be measured by primaries. This question requires us to decide who should be considered "party members." Such decisions, however, are often subject to dispute (Berdahl, 1942) . Ranney (1975) With the increase in the number of presidential primaries, parties have become, in effect, who votes in a party's primaries or caucuses. Yet who should be allowed to vote in these contests is by no means a simple issue. There have been four basic types of rules governing eligibility to vote in primaries. One allows any registered voter to participate in a primarythe "open" primary. A second allows any registered voter to participate, providing the voter declares his or her partisanship at the polling booth. In a third kind of primary, registered independents may vote in either party's primary, but voters registered with one of the parties are limited to their own party's contest (I refer to this type of system as "semi-closed.)" The last type is one in which only voters registered as members of a party can participate in that party's primary-the so-called "closed" primary. '6 In recent years the Democratic Party has tried to keep non-Democrats out of its nominating process. The McGovern-Frasier Commission argued 15 The 50% cut-off is not just an arbitrary stipulation. In electoral systems using the preference ballot, it is the threshold used for identifying a winner (Lakeman, 1970) . 16 Although this four-way breakdown ignores some differences that exist between states, it nonetheless captures the basic options parties and states can use in determining who can participate in primaries.
that "a full opportunity for all Democrats to participate is diluted if members of other parties are allowed to participate in the selection of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention" (p. 47). The last two Democratic Party commissions on the nomination process banned "the use of the 'open primary'-a primary in which voters are not required to declare publicly their party preference and to have that preference publicly recorded-to select or allocate delegates to the national conventions" (Manatt, 1982, pp. 12-13) . These commission rules, however, still permit registered voters to vote in a primary, provided they "declare publicly" their partisanship.
There has been much speculation that participation in a party's primary by the opposition's partisans adversely affects its selection process. There has, however, been little empirical investigation of this matter.'7 Using the CBS/ New York Times and ABC/ Washington Post exit polls, I investigated whether independents and members of the opposition's party have different preferences from those of partisans, and how frequently crossover voting occurs. There is little doubt that independents can alter the outcome of primary elections. But even in closed primaries, in which only party members are supposed to participate, self-identified independents and partisans of the opposition party still constitute a sizable segment of the electorate (see table 3 ). Differing requirements for voting do not appear to have a large effect on the composition of primary electorates.'8 Among closed Democratic primaries 72.6% of the electorate labeled themselves Democrats. In semi-closed contests this proportion declines only to 68.8%.19For open contests the proportion is 65.1%. The Republican figures 18 The likely reason that these rules have only a limited effect on the partisan composition of the electorate is that they do not act as major barriers to participation. To vote, for instance, in a closed primary, all a voter has to do is register with the party. And this act does not provide reliable information about true partisanship (Ranney, 1978, p. 221) . Thus, while the closed primary provides more barriers to participation than these other three rules, it is still not enough of a barrier to prevent crossover voting.
19 There were two surveys in which the partisanship question was not used. Instead a question concerning party registration was used. When these cases are eliminated, the difference becomes 71.8% to 67.8%, not a major difference. These are primaries in which voters must declare they are partisans of a party in order to vote in that party's primary.
Even if it were possible to close the nominating process so that only partisans could vote, would it be desirable? If one wants primaries to nominate highly electable candidates, an argument can be made for allowing independents and partisans from the opposition's party to participate in primaries. When choosing a candidate in the now-defunct mixed system, party leaders typically sought a candidate who could win the support not only from their partisans, but also from independents and weak partisans of the other party. V.0. Key (1964) contended that "each party leadership must maintain the loyalty of its own standpatters; it must also concern itself with the great block of voters uncommitted to either party as well as those who may be weaned away from the opposition." Eisenhower's nomination in 1952 can be largely attributed to the belief of many Republican delegates that he could attract independent and Democratic support that Taft could not. Since now neither party constitutes a majority of the electorate, winning the general election requires a candidate to gain votes from citizens who do not identify with that party. Certainly the Republican success in recent presidential elections can be attributed to that party's ability to attract independents and defectors from the Democratic party.
So if parties want to nominate electable candidates and they use primaries to choose electable nominees, there are good reasons for making certain that the candidates they select are attractive to independents and opposition party voters. It is unlikely that independents would "raid" a party's primary to vote for their least favorite candidate to undermine that party's chances in the general election. A more likely reason for independents (or even partisans of the other party) to vote in a partisan primary is that they found a candidate they would be willing to support in November. Certainly the support Anderson and Wallace received from outside their own party is consistent with this argument. Overacker (1926) came to a similar conclusion in her study of presidential primaries: "A careful study of the cases where the members of one party have participated in the primary of the other party . .. lends no color to the claim of the opponents of the 'open' primary that voters go into the opposing party to throw their vote to the weakest candidates, or the candidates whom they think will be the most easily beaten in the election. In every case they have been motivated by a genuine interest in, and support of, the candidate for whom they voted" (p. 98).
In short, political parties should not worry about trying to limit participation only to partisans. It is in the interest of parties to encourage independents and potential defectors from the other party to participate in its primary, since knowing the preferences of these "swing" voters is useful when trying to select a nominee who has broad support. Thus, the last change in the rules I am advocating is to have the state parties adopt either an "open" primary or "declare at polls" primary.20 20 One might argue, given the evidence in table 3, that changing the rules would have little influence on the partisan composition of primary electorates. While it is true that it may not always make a large difference, there is at least the potential for all registered voters to participate in a primary if they happened to be motivated by a particular candidate. Consequently, if a candidate has a great deal of support outside of the party, there would be an opportunity for it to be expressed.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the current primary system does not provide good information about a candidate's potential popularity for the general election. If the parties want to nominate candidates with broad support, then they should allow independents and weak partisans of the opposing party to participate in primaries, use a proportional representation scheme to allocate delegates, and adopt a preference ballot. Adopting such reforms, however, is not without potential drawbacks, because knowing voters' preferences may not automatically lead to nominating candidates who are capable of winning in November. For instance, these rules may foster hard fought multi-candidate campaigns, which could divide the party so seriously that the fall election would be nearly impossible to win.21 Thus, while the parties may be getting a better indicator of a candidate's popularity, these reforms could have exactly the opposite effect from the one intended. There is a growing literature assessing whether divisive primaries hinder a party's chance for victory in the general election (see Pierson and Smith, 1975; Bernstein, 1977; Lengle, 1980; Born, 1981; Kenney and Rice, 1984, 1985; and Westlye, 1985) .
While divisiveness is a real concern, it should not serve as a major obstacle to nominating highly electable candidates through my "reformed" primary system. First, the literature on the effect of divisive primaries on general election results is mixed (Kenney and Rice, 1984, p. 905). And in those studies that have found divisiveness to be detrimental to the party's chances in the fall election, the effect has been small (Born, 1981; Kenney and Rice, 1985) . The reason for these small, and often conflicting, results may be simply that strong candidates do not face stiff nomination struggles because potential rivals, seeing the popularity of their opponent, decide against running, while weak candidates often have divisive primaries and lose in November, because their vulnerability invites challenges from within their party. Thus, divisiveness per se may have little, if any, impact beyond the effect of the prior strength of the candidates (Born, 1981; and Westlye, 1985) . 21 There are, of course, other problems that might arise from my rules. Allowing independents and opposing partisans to participate, for example, may be seen by loyal partisans as undercutting the values of the party. If disillusioned, the "core" party supporters might be less willing to work for the party and contribute money to its campaign treasury. But I suspect that core partisans would not react in such a way. If the nominee has a good chance of being electable, these core supporters might be more willing to help the nominee, since one generally prefers to back a winner.
Another problem is that a preference ballot could confuse voters (especially the poorly educated ones) and lessen turnout in the short run, leading potentially to primary electorates that are highly unrepresentative of the rank and file selecting the nominee. This concern is reasonable and efforts would have to be made to educate the public about this change.
These potential problems are not, however, as important as the possible effects of divisiveness, since it has direct implications for nominating electable candidates. Second, there is little reason to think my specific reforms would exacerbate the problem of divisiveness in presidential primaries. The proportional representation rule, for example, could keep contenders in the race longer than a system that favors the winner of a primary, which could be harmful to party unity by dragging out the length of the struggle. Yet, with the possible exception of Jesse Jackson, candidates, if anything, tend to drop out of the race too quickly. The winnowing process, rather than the rules allocating delegates, is largely responsible for cutting down the number of active candidates. Moreover, the divisiveness that does exist in presidential primaries is probably more due to the long primary season and the numerous opportunities for the candidates to exchange barbs than The chances of divisiveness may actually be somewhat reduced under my proposed arrangement. The reformed primary system would allocate delegates in proportion to the candidate's share of the vote while using a preference ballot. This combination of rules may help reduce the possibility of hard-fought, multi-candidate primaries. First, and perhaps most important, my rules would prevent candidates who have narrow bases of support from winning primaries, because a candidate must have at least some support among 50% of the electorate. Without the resulting media attention and extra delegates accorded a winner, such candidates may be less willing (and less able) to carry out a protracted battle for the nomination. Second, my proposed system would provide few, if any, delegates to the distant finishers, because when no candidate receives 50% of the vote the preference ballot eliminates the candidate with the fewest votes. Thus, the rules may encourage candidates with little support to withdraw (and may even discourage these type of candidates from undertaking their long-shot campaigns), since they would be securing so few delegates. The remaining candidates may be locked in a competitive and possibly divisive struggle, but no more so than have been recent contenders for the nomination. Finally, since these rules attempt to reflect each candidate's popularity and are not designed to favor specific candidates,22 there may be fewer battles over the rules, as we saw in the 1984 Democratic nomination.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, primaries can offer political parties the opportunity to nominate candidates with broad support, providing the rules governing them are designed to reflect more faithfully the preferences-including second preferences-of both regular party voters and potential party supporters. Party leaders in the "mixed system" did use primaries as indicators of a candidate's electability. John Kennedy's victory over Hubert Humphrey in the 1960 West Virginia primary is probably the most famous case in which the results of a primary were taken as an indication of a candidate's electability. The irony is that with the proliferation of primaries, party leaders have not seized on the opportunity to use primaries in the manner I have advocated.
